Aside from the reports of a few emigres, very little information is available on how military spending decisions are made in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP). This paper presents several hypotheses concerning the determinants of military spending in the NSWP. The author then develops a model of military spending decisionmaking to assess the relative validity of these hypotheses in explaining observed patterns of military spending. The analysis indicates that the primary determinant of military spending levels in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact is utilized national income (UNI). Although increases in UNI appear to lead to increases in military spending, the percentage of military spending in UNI has fallen as these countries have become richer, with the exception of the German Democratic Republic.
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