Pitfalls in the Use of Imperfect Information

by William Dean

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Using game theory and decision theory, this paper considers the impact of underconfidence or overconfidence in battle intelligence and shows how the outcome of faulty decisions compares with that of good decisions. The author concludes that if a commander is willing to take risks, he can exploit imperfect information in a range of situations. However, if he acts on best estimates, he can incur high risks through self-deception.

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