In order to generate substitutes for Western high-technology imports, the Soviet leadership has set out to increase integration of science and technology policy within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). This paper explores reasons for the slow implementation of the CMEA program in science and technology. It suggests that non-Soviet members of CMEA have not been enthusiastic about participating because of concern over the effect of the program on the interests of individual nations, institutional barriers to its success, and a perception that the program confers unilateral benefits on the Soviet Union at the expense of its allies. Future progress in the direction of integration is unlikely without substantial changes in the institutions of CMEA.
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