This paper, based on a workshop presentation sponsored by the National Defense University in June 1988, considers the Soviet military planning system's potential for and vulnerability to deception. The author defines the concept, suggesting that a sound view of deception must take into account the inherently deceptive aspect of operations; and outlines the Soviet planning process, cautioning that the Soviet military may understand the connection between deception and operations better than their Western counterparts. Finally, he presents three approaches to studying deception with the aid of models and simulations.
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