This paper, the text of an essay originally written in 1970, describes the Soviet "defense intelligentsia" that resembled the community of civilian defense analysts in the United States in the late 1960s. Soviet defense planning of the time had begun to admit input from various sources and was no longer the exclusive domain of an oligarchy of top generals. These new sources included civilian scientists and academicians whose outspokenness presaged the pluralistic method of policymaking emerging twenty years later as part of Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika.
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