This paper considers whether Mikhail Gorbachev's "new thinking" contributes to the attainment of Soviet strategic objectives or whether the path of Soviet foreign policy will, as widely assumed, lead to a more stable world. Close scrutiny reveals a remarkable symmetry between Gorbachev's Asian and European policies, and suggests that what may appear to be discrete and unrelated initiatives are really tactical elements of a coherent Eurasian strategy that is intended to serve two major objectives. The authors suggest that the immediate aim of Gorbachev's strategy is to immobilize the West at a time when the Soviet Union seeks a breathing space to revive its deteriorating economy. The longer-term objective is to establish a new modus vivendi with the United States and its allies in traditional power-political terms. Soviet foreign policy must eliminate ideology as a precondition for establishing the New Diplomacy, which, in turn, will lead to a new spheres-of-influence arrangement, or a new Yalta.