Technological Risk

The Case of the Tomahawk Cruise Missile

Eric V. Larson

Expert InsightsPublished 1990

This paper examines the Tomahawk cruise missile program to evaluate the proposition that successful management of the research, development, and acquisition of a major weapon system depends partly on using evolutionary rather than revolutionary breakthroughs and on incremental rather than dramatic performance improvements of an existing technology base. The author reviews the technological risks associated with the major subsystems of the Tomahawk and their integration; examines the program's record for evidence of technological risk as manifested in cost growth, schedule slippage, and performance shortfalls; and develops a model for assessing quantitatively the level of technological risk in the Tomahawk program. The analysis suggests that a low to moderate — and therefore manageable — level of technological risk characterized the program and that the absence of substantial technological risk contributed to its overall success.

Document Details

  • Copyright: RAND Corporation
  • Availability: Web Only
  • Year: 1990
  • Pages: 83
  • Document Number: P-7672-RGS

Citation

Chicago Manual of Style

Larson, Eric V., Technological Risk: The Case of the Tomahawk Cruise Missile. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1990. https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P7672.html.
BibTeX RIS

This publication is part of the RAND paper series. The paper series was a product of RAND from 1948 to 2003 that captured speeches, memorials, and derivative research, usually prepared on authors' own time and meant to be the scholarly or scientific contribution of individual authors to their professional fields. Papers were less formal than reports and did not require rigorous peer review.

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.

RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.