Learning from the Persian Gulf War

by Benjamin S. Lambeth

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Operation Desert Storm was not about weapons effects or "technology." True enough, technology and many allied weapons were indeed star performers. Yet the war was more fundamentally about such things as consensus building and the orderly formation of national goals; about diplomacy and leadership in the pursuit of those goals; and about collective action in the application of combined-arms military power, notably air power, in a coalition context to achieve them when diplomacy and economic sanctions failed to carry the day.

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