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This paper records remarks delivered on February 1, 1994, four days before the violence in Sarajevo that triggered a NATO ultimatum. It sketches several policy options on the table--the U.S. position at the January 1994 NATO Summit, the modified lift-and-strike position of the Action Council for Peace in the Balkans, and the truce-and-pressure-the-Serbs approach of some U.S. analysts. It predicts that in three to five years we will be faced with a Balkans in which Serbia is the principal regional power. This Greater Serbia can take various forms--more-or-less democratic, difficult, pariah, or truncated. A plausible outcome could be a hegemonic Serbia that interacts uneasily with its neighbors. Whatever the outcome, however, the Balkans will be characterized by substantial elements of autocracy and sporadic but persistent violence, requiring a foreign presence to help cope with a difficult situation. This international presence will be more humanitarian than military. The current U.S. approach contains several elements that hurt U.S. interests: lack of clarity about the use of force, ineffective opposition to human rights violations, ambivalence about a political settlement, and a steady weakening of important multilateral organizations--the UN and NATO--on which the U.S. wants to rely.

This report is part of the RAND Corporation paper series. The paper was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1948 to 2003 that captured speeches, memorials, and derivative research, usually prepared on authors' own time and meant to be the scholarly or scientific contribution of individual authors to their professional fields. Papers were less formal than reports and did not require rigorous peer review.

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