The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) prohibits the use of chemical weapons in warfare and places controls on the development, production, stockpiling, and transfer of many chemicals and munitions. The regime calls for the destruction of existing stockpiles of chemical weapons under a strict timetable and the destruction or conversion of production facilities for chemical agents. In identifying the dynamic factors that will affect the viability of the CWC, the current research illuminates strategies for the enforcement of the regime. These enforcement strategies must strike a balance between the goal of achieving effective disarmament and the political and economic costs inherent in enforcing such a far-reaching regime.
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