A study of the interrelation of Soviet strategic military power and foreign policy. Discussed are: (1) the concern of Soviet leaders, after Stalin's death, with political potentialities, as well as dangers, of nuclear weapons; (2) the Soviet attempt to deceive the West by politically exploiting strategic weapons; (3) the differences between the military-political actions Soviet leaders threatened to take and the actions they really could take; and (4) alternative Soviet military policies with their strategic consequences. The conclusion of the report considers the role of strategic power in relation to other factors in forming future Soviet foreign policy.
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