Download eBook for Free

FormatFile SizeNotes
PDF file 2.6 MB

Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 10 or higher for the best experience.


Purchase Print Copy

 Format Price
Add to Cart Paperback66 pages $25.00

Notwithstanding determined efforts during the 1960s to improve major system acquisitions, the typical program exhibited an average cost growth of about 40 percent, a schedule slip of about 15 percent, and 30 percent or 40 percent system performance deviation from original specifications. Cost growth could be anticipated by improving the cost estimation process and incorporating an assessment of the technical advance sought in the program. However, such an achievement would not greatly improve the acquisition process. Evidence from recent European programs and U.S. programs conducted outside the normal Department of Defense procedures supports the adoption of more fundamental changes. System acquisition policy should be flexible but based on incremental acquisition strategies as the normal approach for the 1970s. In particular, development should be separated from subsequent production, and the initial portion of development should concentrate on demonstrating system performance and be conducted in a highly austere fashion. (See also RM-6269.)

This report is part of the RAND report series. The report was a product of RAND from 1948 to 1993 that represented the principal publication documenting and transmitting RAND's major research findings and final research.

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit

RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.