Full Document

FormatFile SizeNotes
PDF file 2.6 MB

Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 10 or higher for the best experience.


Purchase Print Copy

 FormatList Price Price
Add to Cart Paperback66 pages $25.00 $20.00 20% Web Discount

Notwithstanding determined efforts during the 1960s to improve major system acquisitions, the typical program exhibited an average cost growth of about 40 percent, a schedule slip of about 15 percent, and 30 percent or 40 percent system performance deviation from original specifications. Cost growth could be anticipated by improving the cost estimation process and incorporating an assessment of the technical advance sought in the program. However, such an achievement would not greatly improve the acquisition process. Evidence from recent European programs and U.S. programs conducted outside the normal Department of Defense procedures supports the adoption of more fundamental changes. System acquisition policy should be flexible but based on incremental acquisition strategies as the normal approach for the 1970s. In particular, development should be separated from subsequent production, and the initial portion of development should concentrate on demonstrating system performance and be conducted in a highly austere fashion. (See also RM-6269.)

This report is part of the RAND Corporation Report series. The report was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1948 to 1993 that represented the principal publication documenting and transmitting RAND's major research findings and final research.

Permission is given to duplicate this electronic document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND Permissions page.

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.