A Methodology for the Analysis of Collocated Hard Site Defense

by Ralph E. Strauch

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A mathematical model for analyzing the survivability of hard targets protected by adjoining radar and interceptor defenses softer than the targets themselves. The model assumes pure missile attacks without decoys or countermeasures, and a one-on-one defensive firing doctrine. Penetration methods are leakage and defense exhaustion. The probability of target survival is derived as a function of the number of attacking reentry vehicles (RV), considering the differential hardness of target and defense and the reliability of the attacking missiles. The effect of defense randomization is considered. If the attacker has two kinds of RV, it is better for him to send all the poorer ones first. Two methods are given for optimal allocation of a fixed-attack force: linear programming, which is well adapted to computer processing; and false pricing, which is suitable for hand calculation. Defense optimization is not considered.

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