A Methodology for the Analysis of Collocated Hard Site Defense
ResearchPublished 1971
ResearchPublished 1971
A mathematical model for analyzing the survivability of hard targets protected by adjoining radar and interceptor defenses softer than the targets themselves. The model assumes pure missile attacks without decoys or countermeasures, and a one-on-one defensive firing doctrine. Penetration methods are leakage and defense exhaustion. The probability of target survival is derived as a function of the number of attacking reentry vehicles (RV), considering the differential hardness of target and defense and the reliability of the attacking missiles. The effect of defense randomization is considered. If the attacker has two kinds of RV, it is better for him to send all the poorer ones first. Two methods are given for optimal allocation of a fixed-attack force: linear programming, which is well adapted to computer processing; and false pricing, which is suitable for hand calculation. Defense optimization is not considered.
This publication is part of the RAND report series. The report series, a product of RAND from 1948 to 1993, represented the principal publication documenting and transmitting RAND's major research findings and final research.
This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.
RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.