A study of U.S. and Soviet planning, policy, and negotiating institutions involved in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and of the salient substantive issues of interrelated strategic policy, with the SALT II period receiving more detailed scrutiny. Separate sections focus on the November 1974 Vladivostok transaction and its implications and on the interaction between SALT and detente. Some conclusions are presented in a final section, in which the author's own interpretative and speculative views on a number of questions, many controversial, are presented more explicitly. Some substantial agreements have been reached in SALT, and these have by no means been wholly one-sided in the USSR's favor. However, on most of the unsettled issues--MIRV counting and verification, which bombers to include, the cruise- and ballistic-missile issue, and perhaps FBS--the Soviets have taken the position that compromise means essentially that the U.S. should accommodate to their view.