This report considers the proclivities of the Soviet armed forces on the battlefield. Its conclusions are based on an examination of Soviet memoirs of the war with Germany and of Soviet military publications since then. The author suggests that, in substantial measure, Soviet peculiarities in warfighting are attempts to ward off undesirable tendencies which Soviet leaders perceive in their subordinates as well as in themselves.
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