Constraints on U.S. Strategy in Third World Conflict
Implications for Certain Contingencies
ResearchPublished 1985
The author examines the military and political constraints imposed on U.S. strategy and combat operations in past Third World conflicts and crises. He explores the implications of such constraints for the design and execution of future strategies.
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Document Details
- Copyright: RAND Corporation
- Availability: Web Only
- Year: 1985
- Pages: 18
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.7249/pubs
- Document Number: R-3208/1-AF
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