Improving the NATO Force Planning Process
Lessons from Past Efforts
ResearchPublished 1986
Since the early 1970s, various initiatives have been made to improve the NATO defense planning process. This report examines some of these efforts. The purpose is to identify some broad guidelines for introducing and managing future initiatives. The report identifies the most important lessons learned from past initiatives and applies them to current defense improvement programs.
Topics
Document Details
- Copyright: RAND Corporation
- Availability: Web Only
- Year: 1986
- Pages: 58
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.7249/pubs
- Document Number: R-3383-USDP
Citation
RAND Style Manual
Wendt, James C. and Nanette C. Gantz, Improving the NATO Force Planning Process: Lessons from Past Efforts, RAND Corporation, R-3383-USDP, 1986. As of July 12, 2026: https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R3383.html
Chicago Manual of Style
Wendt, James C. and Nanette C. Gantz, Improving the NATO Force Planning Process: Lessons from Past Efforts. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1986. https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R3383.html.
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