This report attempts to illuminate the conflict within the Soviet Union between the Communist Party and the military high command over resource allocation in the early 1980s. It examines the measures of resource growth that the two sides could have used in the debate. It also considers Gorbachev's approach to the same problem in the last half of the 1980s and the connections between the two episodes. The author suggests that, in the future, Gorbachev's ability to maneuver may be limited by the growing harshness of military-Party relations. Furthermore, his failure to make good on his promises could aggravate the military-Party conflict.
This report is part of the RAND Corporation Report series. The report was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1948 to 1993 that represented the principal publication documenting and transmitting RAND's major research findings and final research.
Permission is given to duplicate this electronic document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND Permissions page.
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.