Army 21 as the U.S. Army's Future Warfighting Concept
A Critical Review of Approach and Assumptions
ResearchPublished 1988
A Critical Review of Approach and Assumptions
ResearchPublished 1988
This report discusses an attempt to identify the major problems with the existing Army 21 Interim Operational Concept and suggests an alternative framework for the Army's study of future warfighting concepts. With the current Army doctrine — AirLand Battle — as the baseline, the plausible variations in implementation should be made over the next 10 to 15 years. The objective would be to project an estimate of Army needs and preferences. A long-term exploration effort would extend 30 to 40 years, where projections are necessarily highly speculative. Essentially deductive, this effort would consider a range of visions and would highlight generic developments. The purpose would be to stimulate conceptual thinking by contrasting different concepts, profiting from comparisons and choices between and among them.
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