This report is concerned with the methods the services use to determine their conventional munitions requirements (point estimates of the quantities of munitions the services would buy to arm their planned forces given sufficient funds). The authors summarize the services' requirements processes, noting significant differences in the ways the four services approach munitions requirements estimation. They suggest two categories of improvements — near-term changes to correct flaws in the current methods, and more fundamental reforms that raise some complex issues obscured by the current munitions requirements processes. The report suggests that munitions requirements planners should deal with uncertainties that are now largely ignored and explicitly examine constraints such as munitions resupply logistics.
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