The Army's Role in Counterinsurgency and Insurgency
ResearchPublished 1990
ResearchPublished 1990
This report identifies potential initiatives for improving Army doctrine and capabilities for counterinsurgency and insurgency warfare. These include recommendations that the Army (1) build and maintain small cadres of counterinsurgency and insurgency experts; (2) create, along with the other services, a counterinsurgency institute to train U.S. and foreign nationals; and (3) ensure more appropriate and effective U.S. arms and equipment transfers to countries facing insurgent threats. The author also examines the reasons insurgency is likely to continue to be a frequent form of conflict; describes the threat of insurgency to important U.S. interests in the Third World; explores the potential for U.S. Army noncombat support to Third World countries fighting insurgency; describes the impediments to U.S. influence and assistance; outlines the potential situations that might lead to U.S. involvement in counterinsurgency combat; and discusses the Army's role in support of friendly insurgency.
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