Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgencies: The Rhodesian Experience

Bruce Hoffman, Jennifer Taw, David W. Arnold

ResearchPublished 1991

This report examines the counterinsurgency campaign waged by Rhodesia between 1965 and 1980. Its purpose is to analyze the lessons learned from the Rhodesian conflict and to assess the relevance of these lessons both to United States low-intensity-conflict training and doctrine and to the insurgencies occurring at this time in Central America. The research concentrated on the four areas common to most insurgencies: (1) security force organization and attendant command-control-communication issues; (2) countermeasures to suppress urban terrorism; (3) rural pacification and security; and (4) intelligence collection, collation, and dissemination. The greatest challenge facing the U.S. Army in evolving a credible and coherent low-intensity-conflict doctrine today is that of overcoming the institutional barriers that inhibit change and adaptation. The Army must adjust its dominant conventional warfighting mindset to the vagaries and complexities of warfare at the low end of the conflict spectrum.

Order a Print Copy

Format
Paperback
Page count
108 pages
List Price
$30.00
Buy link
Add to Cart

Document Details

  • Availability: Available
  • Year: 1991
  • Print Format: Paperback
  • Paperback Pages: 108
  • Paperback Price: $30.00
  • Paperback ISBN/EAN: 978-0-8330-1123-7
  • Document Number: R-3998-A

Citation

RAND Style Manual
Hoffman, Bruce, Jennifer Taw, and David W. Arnold, Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgencies: The Rhodesian Experience, RAND Corporation, R-3998-A, 1991. As of October 10, 2024: https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R3998.html
Chicago Manual of Style
Hoffman, Bruce, Jennifer Taw, and David W. Arnold, Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgencies: The Rhodesian Experience. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1991. https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R3998.html. Also available in print form.
BibTeX RIS

Research conducted by

The research described in this report was performed under the auspices of the RAND Arroyo Center Policy and Strategy Program.

This publication is part of the RAND report series. The report series, a product of RAND from 1948 to 1993, represented the principal publication documenting and transmitting RAND's major research findings and final research.

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.

RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.