The end of the Cold War has altered the hostile yet predictable environment in which U.S. defense planning was performed for 40 years. Now is the time to revisit and define the first principles of U.S. national security strategy. This report presents an approach to thinking about U.S. strategic forces in the 1990s. It attempts to answer why the United States needs strategic forces, what national objectives strategic forces can support, how these objectives might change in response to a dynamic environment, and how to translate choices among objectives into terms that will be relevant to strategic force planners.
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