Project AIR FORCE Analysis of the Air War in the Gulf

An Assessment of Strategic Airlift Operational Efficiency

John Lund, Ruth T. Berg, Corinne Replogle

ResearchPublished 1993

The 1990 airlift during Operation Desert Shield moved ten times the daily ton-miles of the Berlin Airlift. In the main, this airlift operation was successful, but it did not attain expected performance. Operations began without a feasible transportation plan and requirements changed frequently as the situation developed. Half the Air Mobility Command's strategic aircrews are in the reserves; they were not called up until 16 days into deployment. The small number of en route and offload bases made the entire system sensitive to disruptions at those bases, such as weather or ramp congestion. Maintenance problems resulted in aircraft unavailability. Among other suggestions, the authors recommend that 1) knowledgeable transporters be included early in contingency planning to ensure the feasibility of courses of action, 2) access to adequate bases be ensured both en route and in the theater, 3) measures be taken to ensure that the U.S. Transportation Command or the Air Mobility Command has sufficient aircrews in a crisis, 4) the aging C-141 fleet be replaced by C-17s.

Document Details

Citation

Chicago Manual of Style

Lund, John, Ruth T. Berg, and Corinne Replogle, Project AIR FORCE Analysis of the Air War in the Gulf: An Assessment of Strategic Airlift Operational Efficiency. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1993. https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R4269z4.html.
BibTeX RIS

Research conducted by

This publication is part of the RAND report series. The report series, a product of RAND from 1948 to 1993, represented the principal publication documenting and transmitting RAND's major research findings and final research.

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.

RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.