Uniformity Theorems in Missile Duels.
ResearchPublished 1971
A theorem dealing with the purchase of defensive weapon systems is proven. The purchaser's objective is assumed to be the achievement of an assumed destruction criterion at minimal cost. It is shown that under certain circumstances it is optimal to purchase a uniform defensive system. The applicability of the mathematical theorem to the real world is then studied. A second theorem gives a simple procedure for finding an attacker's optimal firing rule under very general circumstances. An example illustrates the problems in choosing a defensive weapon system. 29 pp. Ref.
Document Details
- Copyright: RAND Corporation
- Availability: Web Only
- Year: 1971
- Pages: 29
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.7249/pubs
- Document Number: R-844-PR
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