Cover: Organizing and Managing Unconventional War in Laos, 1962-1970

Organizing and Managing Unconventional War in Laos, 1962-1970

Published 1972

by Douglas S. Blaufarb

Download

Download eBook for Free

FormatFile SizeNotes
PDF file 5.1 MB

Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 10 or higher for the best experience.

Purchase

Purchase Print Copy

 Format Price
Add to Cart Paperback117 pages $15.00

A case study in a broader examination of the strengths and weakness of the U.S. government in dealing with counterinsurgency. This report describes and assesses the U.S. role in Laos from 1962, when the Geneva Accords went formally into effect, to 1970, when the "quiet war" in Laos intensified and changed its character. The emphasis is on organizational and managerial problems, especially given the constraints imposed by the Geneva Accords.

This report is part of the RAND report series. The report was a product of RAND from 1948 to 1993 that represented the principal publication documenting and transmitting RAND's major research findings and final research.

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.

RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.