A case study in a broader examination of the strengths and weakness of the U.S. government in dealing with counterinsurgency. This report describes and assesses the U.S. role in Laos from 1962, when the Geneva Accords went formally into effect, to 1970, when the "quiet war" in Laos intensified and changed its character. The emphasis is on organizational and managerial problems, especially given the constraints imposed by the Geneva Accords.
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