The NATO enlargement debate has focused on the question of which countries should be offered membership in the first round. Equally important is how the alliance deals with countries left out in that round--the so-called "have-nots." Now that the process is moving from declarations of intent to action, members must forge a clear policy toward the have-nots if NATO is to achieve its post-Cold War goal of security integration and cooperation in Europe. The primary objective of a NATO strategy toward the have-nots is prevention of a destabilizing backlash in those countries seeking membership but not included in enlargement's first round. The strategy suggested in this article provides a way of managing the dilemma without ceding to Russia a real or shadow veto over enlargement.
Originally published in: Foreign Affairs, December 1996, v. 75, no. 6, pp. 13-20.
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