Cover: Information superiority and game theory : the value of information in four games

Information superiority and game theory : the value of information in four games

The Value of Information in Four Games

Published 1999

by Richard E. Darilek, Sharon Brown, Jerome Bracken

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To assist in the understanding of how different types of information affect the outcome of an adversary process, the paper focuses on the concept of information superiority, exploring its dimensions. The paper draws on game theory to obtain insight into the problem. Four games are postulated, as follows: (1) Side 1 and Side 2 have correct information, (2) Side 1 has correct information and Side 2 has incorrect information, (3) Side 1 and Side 2 have correct information and Side 1 knows Side 2's choice of strategy, and (4) Side 1 has correct informaiton, Side 2 has incorrect information, and Side 1 knows Side 2's choice of strategy. The number of strategies available to both sides is varied. The result is that the value of the various types of information differs substantially, allowing both quantitative and qualitative insights about the value of possessing correct information, denying correct information to the opponent, and knowing the opponent's chosen strategy.

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Originally published in: Phalanx, v. 31, no. 4, December 1998, pp. 6-7, 33-34.

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