In this article, the authors explore alternative strategies for class-action reform aimed at improving the cost-benefit ratio of damage class actions. They sought to identify mechanisms for enhancing the court system's capacity to screen out non-meritorious suits, while preserving access to the courts for meritorious actions. Among other findings, the authors recommend that judges use their existing authority to regulate class action more strictly by more vigorously reviewing and approving settlements and fee-award requests. The authors also recommend further scholarly investigation of the merits and demerits of two-way, loser-pays fee shifting with liability on the plaintiffs' side borne by class counsel.
Originally published in: Law and Contemporary Problems, v. 64, Spring/Summer 2001, nos. 2 & 3, pp. 137-161.
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