Report
Beyond al-Qaeda: Part 1, The Global Jihadist Movement
Oct 25, 2006
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Although the U.S.-led global war on terrorism has had some notable successes — such as the destruction of al-Qaeda’s sanctuary in Afghanistan, the elimination of many of the group’s leaders, and the growing resolve of many countries to take action against al-Qaeda and its associates — no informed observers believe that al-Qaeda will be eradicated any time soon. Indeed, in some respects, al-Qaeda has metastasized into an even more formidable adversary, dispersed across the world, largely self-sustaining, and constantly adopting new and innovative tactics. The United States itself continues to be threatened by large-scale attacks. Thus, countering al-Qaeda is likely to preoccupy U.S. national security institutions for at least the remainder of this decade, and probably longer.
RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF) studied the shape of future threats to the United States and U.S. security interests from terrorist and other extremist organizations. The study analyzed four sources or categories of threat:
Defeating the global jihadist movement — which we define as al-Qaeda and its nebula — is the most pressing security challenge facing the United States today. But U.S. policymakers should not ignore the threat that local, un-affiliated groups pose. Clearly, al-Qaeda leaders hope that their efforts will persuade other Islamic militant groups to join the global jihad. From a policy perspective, the first-order question is whether insurgent or terrorist groups currently outside the global jihad will move closer to or farther away from that movement. Just because some of these groups have not joined does not mean that they should be dismissed; some local groups pose deadly threats to the states they seek to subvert, and others, like Hezbollah, could suddenly emerge as global concerns.
No one tool is likely to be decisive against al-Qaeda. An effective strategy for countering and defeating the global jihadist movement will necessarily employ a complex mixture of military, intelligence, financial, political, legal, and even social instruments.
It follows that a comprehensive U.S. strategy needs to move beyond the boundaries of conventional counter-terrorism theory and practice to address the ideological and political factors that motivate much of the threat. Such a strategy would have three main elements:
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