Effects of Medicare's Prospective Payment System on the Quality of Hospital Care
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Citation
Format:Draper, David, William H. Rogers, Katherine L. Kahn, and Emmett B. Keeler, Effects of Medicare's Prospective Payment System on the Quality of Hospital Care. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1998. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB4519.html.
Draper, David, William H. Rogers, Katherine L. Kahn, and Emmett B. Keeler, Effects of Medicare's Prospective Payment System on the Quality of Hospital Care, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RB-4519, 1998. As of June 16, 2021: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB4519.html