The convergence of the discrete analogues of differential games: part I.

by Herbert E. Scarf


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An examination of a class of survival games in an arbitrary n-dimensional region R and with an arbitrary payoff function f(x) on the boundary. It is assumed that the players cannot force the state of the game to proceed in any direction. (See also P-742.)

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