Cover: Information in games with finite resources

Information in games with finite resources

Published 1955

by David Gale

Purchase Print Copy

 Format Price
Add to Cart Paperback1 pages $20.00

A proof that, in games with finite resources, the uniform mixed strategy is optimal. Therefore, a player is not helped by knowing the strategies available to his opponent. (Also published as P-861.)

This report is part of the RAND research memorandum series. The Research Memorandum was a product of RAND from 1948 to 1973 that represented working papers meant to report current results of RAND research to appropriate audiences.

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.

RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.