The Aftermath of a Single Nuclear Detonation by Accident or Sabotage
Some Problems Affecting US Policy, Military Reactions, and Public Information
ResearchPublished 1959
Some Problems Affecting US Policy, Military Reactions, and Public Information
ResearchPublished 1959
Describes what might be the political, military, and policy consequences if a single nuclear weapon were detonated either by accident or by an enemy in a way that simulates an accident that could be blamed on the United States.
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