A characterization of those n-person games that can be solved by excluding one or more players from a share of the proceeds and then solving the ensuing "fraction" of the original game. It is shown that a discriminatory solution exists if, and only if, there is one group of players strong enough to enforce all possible distributions of proceeds in the original game that exclude the "out" players. Some previously known results that follow as special cases of this general condition are given.
This report is part of the RAND Corporation Research memorandum series. The Research Memorandum was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1948 to 1973 that represented working papers meant to report current results of RAND research to appropriate audiences.
Permission is given to duplicate this electronic document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND Permissions page.
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.