The significance of Chinese communist treatment of Khrushchev's January 14 speech on strategy
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An examination of Communist China's reactions to the speech of Premier Khrushchev of January 14, 1960. The study shows how new and important changes in Soviet strategic thinking might affect Sino-Soviet strategic relations. For example, the Chinese used Khrushchev's reference to the role Russia would play in disarmament discussions to assert that no international disarmament agreement would be binding on China without her formal participation and adherence. Other Chinese reactions to this speech were divulged both by what was commented on and by what was apparently deliberately reported without comment.
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