An examination of Communist China's reactions to the speech of Premier Khrushchev of January 14, 1960. The study shows how new and important changes in Soviet strategic thinking might affect Sino-Soviet strategic relations. For example, the Chinese used Khrushchev's reference to the role Russia would play in disarmament discussions to assert that no international disarmament agreement would be binding on China without her formal participation and adherence. Other Chinese reactions to this speech were divulged both by what was commented on and by what was apparently deliberately reported without comment.
This report is part of the RAND Corporation Research memorandum series. The Research Memorandum was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1948 to 1973 that represented working papers meant to report current results of RAND research to appropriate audiences.
Our mission to help improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis is enabled through our core values of quality and objectivity and our unwavering commitment to the highest level of integrity and ethical behavior. To help ensure our research and analysis are rigorous, objective, and nonpartisan, we subject our research publications to a robust and exacting quality-assurance process; avoid both the appearance and reality of financial and other conflicts of interest through staff training, project screening, and a policy of mandatory disclosure; and pursue transparency in our research engagements through our commitment to the open publication of our research findings and recommendations, disclosure of the source of funding of published research, and policies to ensure intellectual independence. For more information, visit www.rand.org/about/research-integrity.
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.