An analysis of the military actions in Laos in the summer and fall of 1959 and of their political-military background. The events are treated as a special case of limited war. Contrary to normal expectations, the initiative was on the side of the Free World. Communist actions were fully coordinated among three partners but were reactive in nature. Both sides operated under severe restraints, which kept the action to a minimum level. The status quo at the termination of real combat was not wholly satisfactory to either side. Military action could recur in this area under varying circumstances.
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