The Violation of Arms-Control Agreements

Deterrence vs. Detection

Fred Charles Ikle

ResearchPublished 1960

An examination of the likelihood that a potential violator of an arms control agreement will not be deterred by the risk of detection unless he fears that his gains from an evasion will be outweighed by unfavorable consequences. To determine the consequences of a detected evasion, this study discusses (1) the effect of a reaction by world opinion, (2) the political reaction of the injured country, (3) the military measures undertaken by the injured country to restore the situation that would have existed without an agreement, and (4) the military and political measures that go beyond this "restoration."

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Ikle, Fred Charles, The Violation of Arms-Control Agreements: Deterrence vs. Detection. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1960. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM2609.html.
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