A first reaction to the new Soviet book "Military strategy"

by Thomas W. Wolfe

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An analysius of the new Soviet book, Military Strategy. Its significance is weighed against the background of certain known developments of recent years: the military's resistance to Khrushchev's strategic reforms of 1960; The dispute between radical and traditionalist elements within the Soviet military establishment; and the dialogue with the United States on the strategic power balance. The author discerns signs of compromise among these conflicting viewpoints, which suggest to him that the Soviet book reflects not a unified doctrine, but a temporary balance of views in a continuing debate, whose later phases are likely to bring further doctrinal modifications. An analysis of the new Soviet book, [Military Strategy]. Its significance is weighed against the background of certain known developments of recent years: the military's resistance to Khrushchev's strategic reforms of 1960; the dispute between radical and traditionalist elements within the Soviet military establishment; and the dialogue with the United States on the strategic power balance. The author discerns signs of compromise among these conflicting viewpoints, which suggest to him that the Soviet book reflects not a unified doctrine, but a temporary balance of views in a continuing debate, whose later phases are likely to bring further doctrinal modifications. (See also RM-3730.) 134 pp.

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