An analysis of Soviet political and strategic calculations and behavior in the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. The analysis centers on (1) Soviet objectives in deploying strategic weapons in Cuba; (2) the considerations that may have led the Soviet leaders to believe they could succeed; and (3) the reasons for their precipitate withdrawal of the weapons. Prime importance is attached to the role of the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance, both in determining the objectives pursued by the Soviet Union in Cuba, and in bringing about the crisis outcome.
This report is part of the RAND Corporation Research memorandum series. The Research Memorandum was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1948 to 1973 that represented working papers meant to report current results of RAND research to appropriate audiences.
This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.