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A description of an aggregated, two-sided war game, designed as the capping routine in a family of models for planning strategic operations. A payoff function for the war game is defined, making use of an assumption of increasing concern as a critical level of damage is approached. A very simple, one-weapon version of the central nuclear war game has an analytic solution, indicating the existence of a stable (equilibrium) point in pure strategies if each side has a nonnegligible counterforce capability.

This report is part of the RAND Corporation research memorandum series. The Research Memorandum was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1948 to 1973 that represented working papers meant to report current results of RAND research to appropriate audiences.

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.