Cuba and Pearl Harbor

Hindsight and Foresight

Roberta M. Wohlstetter

ResearchPublished 1965

A comparison of the amount, value, and interpretation of intelligence data in the Pearl Harbor crisis with those in the Cuban crisis. In both cases the data were ambiguous and incomplete. There was never a single, definitive signal, but rather a number of signals that, when put together, tended to crystallize suspicion. The true signals were always embedded in the noise or irrelevance of false ones.

Document Details

  • Copyright: RAND Corporation
  • Availability: Web Only
  • Year: 1965
  • Pages: 47
  • Document Number: RM-4328

Citation

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Wohlstetter, Roberta M., Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1965. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM4328.html.
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