Equilibrium Points in Game Theory
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A discussion of equilibrium points in n-person games, with a comparison of the Cournot, Stackelberg, and Edgeworth solutions.
This report is part of the RAND Corporation Research memorandum series. The Research Memorandum was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1948 to 1973 that represented working papers meant to report current results of RAND research to appropriate audiences.
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Citation
Format:Samuelson, Paul Anthony, Equilibrium Points in Game Theory. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1950. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM484.html. Also available in print form.
Samuelson, Paul Anthony, Equilibrium Points in Game Theory, RAND Corporation, RM-484, 1950. As of December 1, 2022: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM484.html