An examination of the experiences of the Vietminh cadres who remained in South Vietnam after 1954 and their part in orgainzing the Viet Cong insurgency. The experience of these Vietminh cadres under the Diem regime may have an important bearing on the conditions for a settlement of the present war. Many Viet Cong are likely to regard future promises of an amnesty with cynicism. This attitude may well be shared by the Communist leaders in Hanoi, who may also fear that any solution leaving south Vietnam under GVN control would meet with the strongest objections from important segments of the Southern cadres. Negotiating a settlement with the Saigon government might strike the Northern leaders as risking the loss of their most valuable political investment: control over the Viet Cong movement in the South.
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