Cover: The Pathological Nature of Certain Games with Rational Payoff.

The Pathological Nature of Certain Games with Rational Payoff.

by Irving Leonard Glicksberg, Oliver Alfred Gross

A construction of an example of a continuous game with rational payoff in which the unique optimal strategy for one player has a countable set of jumps, the jumps occurring at a dense set of points. The example would seem to shatter the view that games with rational payoffs can be solved by methods similar to those used in polynomial games.

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