The Pathological Nature of Certain Games with Rational Payoff.

Irving Leonard Glicksberg, Oliver Alfred Gross

ResearchPublished 1951

A construction of an example of a continuous game with rational payoff in which the unique optimal strategy for one player has a countable set of jumps, the jumps occurring at a dense set of points. The example would seem to shatter the view that games with rational payoffs can be solved by methods similar to those used in polynomial games.

Document Details

  • Copyright: RAND Corporation
  • Availability: Out Of Print
  • Year: 1951
  • Pages: 9
  • Document Number: RM-549-PR

Citation

Chicago Manual of Style

Glicksberg, Irving Leonard and Oliver Alfred Gross, The Pathological Nature of Certain Games with Rational Payoff. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1951. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM549.html.
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