A study of the problems of providing access to existing technology in order to overcome some of the barriers to price competition in the reprocurement of weapon system components, accessories, support equipment, and other specialized items. Entry of new firms into the production of technical hard goods is often hampered by three major barriers: (1) high start-up costs; (2) the original developer's possession of patents or proprietary rights to technical information; and (3) the government's inability to provide new firms with technological rights and with data sufficient to support competitive has production. Although the government generated some new policies on the collection and dissemination of data to potential suppliers, the percentage of reprocurements resulting from this dissemination is small and much essential information is not included in data packages. The aerospace industry has had vast experience in the transfer of production technology through the use of commercial licensing arrangements. The techniques used commercially could be adapted to reprocurement under a policy of directed licensing. The government would derive several advantages from such a policy, including increased competition.
Johnson, R. E. and James W. McKie, Competition in the Reprocurement Process. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1968. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM5657.html. Also available in print form.
Johnson, R. E. and James W. McKie, Competition in the Reprocurement Process, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RM-5657-PR, 1968. As of October 06, 2021: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM5657.html