Fighting and Negotiating in Vietnam
A Strategy
ResearchPublished 1969
A Strategy
ResearchPublished 1969
A fighting-and-negotiating strategy is desirable that encourages emergence of a broader, moderate GVN that can coalesce non-Communist factions and exploit divergencies in the Communist camp. Our negotiation objective should aim at permitting diversification of Communist interests in SEA, discouraging Communist expectations of complete control of SVN, while promoting peaceful coexistence between North and South. A compromise settlement will mean accepting some Communist participation in South Vietnamese political life, contingent upon Communist concessions that would increase the likelihood of a democratic Southern government and encourage Northern independence from China. If, after such a settlement, the South did go Communist gradually, without major violence, unfavorable impact on the evolution of Southeast Asia would be minimal.
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