Health Care Reform

Distributional Consequences of an Employer Mandate for Workers in Small Firms

Cheryl L. Damberg

ResearchPublished 1996

This study simulates the economic incidence of an employer health insurance mandate on the earnings of workers. Specifically, it evaluates the distributional impact of the mandate provisions contained in the 1993 Health Security Act proposed by the Clinton administration.

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Damberg, Cheryl L., Health Care Reform: Distributional Consequences of an Employer Mandate for Workers in Small Firms. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1996. https://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD122.html.
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