This paper investigates whether the regulatory regime created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) has driven firms in general, and small firms in particular, out of the public capital market. Previous attempts to address this question have had difficulty controlling for other factors that could have affected exit decisions around the enactment of SOX. To address this difficulty, the authors examine the post-SOX change in the propensity of public American target firms to be bought by private acquirers rather than public ones with the corresponding change for foreign target firms, which were outside the purview of SOX. Their findings are consistent with the hypothesis that SOX induced small firms to exit the public capital market during the first year of its enactment. Large firms, by contrast, do not appear to have been affected.
The research described in this report was conducted by the Kauffman-RAND Institute for Entrepreneurship Public Policy within the RAND Institute for Civil Justice.
This report is part of the RAND Corporation Working paper series. RAND working papers are intended to share researchers' latest findings and to solicit informal peer review. They have been approved for circulation by RAND but may not have been formally edited or peer reviewed.
This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.