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Submarines

Underwater vessels first existed as early as the 17th century but did not become critical components of modern navies until the 20th century. RAND analysts have examined the submarine's role in nuclear conflict, the design of new submarines for the Australian navy, and the future role of unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs).

Commentary
AUKUS as Big Science?
AUKUS—the trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—framed as a multinational quest for discovery rather than a security pact made sensible by deterrence logics, could be a political boon, both diplomatically and domestically.
Oct 24, 2023
Brochure
The Alliance Initiative: RAND's Support for the Australia–United Kingdom–United States (AUKUS) Partnership
RAND is well positioned to support an Australia-United Kingdom-United States security partnership.
Mar 29, 2022
Commentary
Making AUKUS Work
In September 2021, President Biden announced the creation of AUKUS, a trilateral, experimental arrangement among the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom focused on defense technology. The barriers to success are numerous but the partnership could offer significant opportunities.
Mar 22, 2022
Commentary
Nuclear Subs Idea Worth Floating
Whether Australia should operate and maintain nuclear-propelled attack submarines has been debated for years. While controversial to some, the option of nuclear subs in Australia's future fleet may be a useful alternative given trends in the country's security environment.
Oct 1, 2019
Report
Advancing Autonomous Systems: An Analysis of Current and Future Technology for Unmanned Maritime Vehicles
In this report, RAND researchers explore current and potential military applications of autonomous systems, focusing especially on unmanned undersea vehicles and unmanned surface vehicles.
Jan 4, 2019
Commentary
Location, Location, Location: Evaluating Risks to Submarines from Low-Yield Warhead and Submarine Missile Launch Detection
Experts can argue that a low-yield SLBM might not be worth deploying as it would put U.S. submarines at unacceptable risk. But the costs to adversaries to develop the capability to target U.S. submarines with nuclear weapons are substantial. In contrast, the costs to the United States are low, requiring only modification to an existing warhead.
Mar 12, 2018
Commentary
Discrimination Details Matter: Clarifying an Argument About Low-Yield Nuclear Warheads
Nuclear forces and nuclear strategy are complex and the facts surrounding them are often shrouded in classification. But if the United States were to deploy a low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead in the future, an adversary would face the same problems as it does today in knowing what the missile contains
Feb 16, 2018
Commentary
China's Naval Modernization: Where Is It Headed?
The PLA Navy is expanding its capabilities and operations to reduce vulnerabilities in China's near seas, but also to aggressively support its expanding global ambitions and challenge U.S. leadership in Asia.
Feb 10, 2016
News Release
China's Military Modernization Increasingly Challenges U.S. Defense Capabilities in Asia
Although China continues to lag behind the United States in terms of aggregate military hardware and operational skills, it has improved its capabilities relative to those of the U.S. in many critical areas. Moreover, China does not need to catch up fully in order to challenge U.S. ability to conduct effective military operations near the Chinese mainland.
Sep 14, 2015
Research Brief
Tallying the U.S.-China Military Scorecard
A set of “scorecards” assesses the relative capabilities of U.S. and Chinese military forces in diverse types of conflict, at varying distances from the Chinese mainland, and at different points in time.
Sep 14, 2015
Report
China's Military Modernization Increasingly Challenges U.S. Defense Capabilities in Asia
Although China continues to lag behind the United States in terms of aggregate military hardware and operational skills, it has improved its capabilities relative to those of the U.S. in many critical areas. Moreover, China does not need to catch up fully in order to challenge U.S. ability to conduct effective military operations near the Chinese mainland.
Sep 14, 2015
Testimony
The Role of Maritime and Air Power in the DoD's Third Offset Strategy
Russia and China have been investing in military modernization programs to blunt the U.S. military's technological edge, fielding advanced aircraft, submarines, and both longer range and more accurate missiles. The DoD's Third Offset Strategy is a much-needed initiative to identify and invest in innovative ways to sustain and advance America's military dominance for the 21st century.
Dec 2, 2014
Report
RAND NSRD Annual Report 2011-2012
Surveys the work of the RAND National Security Research Division from the spring of 2011 through the winter of 2012.
Jun 8, 2012
Research Brief
Australia's Domestic Submarine Design Capabilities: Options for the Future Submarine
To design a new naval submarine domestically, Australia's industry and Government will need about 1,000 skilled draftsmen and engineers. Cultivating this workforce could take 15-20 years; partnering with foreign designers could expedite the process.
Dec 22, 2011
News Release
RAND Issues New Study on Australia's Submarine Design Capabilities and Capacities
When it comes to designing a new submarine, Australia has considerable expertise, but some gaps still exist.
Dec 15, 2011
Report
Australia Has Considerable Expertise in Submarine Design, but Gaps Still Exist
The Royal Australian Navy intends to acquire 12 new submarines to replace its Collins-class vessels. RAND assessed the domestic engineering and design skills that Australian industry and government will need to design the new submarine, identified the skills they currently possess, and evaluated how to fill any gaps between the two.
Dec 15, 2011
Report
Learning from Experience: Australia's Collins Submarine Program
A RAND study of previously successful submarine programs reveals that future programs must focus on stability, roles and responsibilities of the government and private organizations, and the need for experienced managers and a strategic view of the submarine force and industrial base.
Dec 9, 2011
Report
Learning from Experience: Volume II: Lessons from the U.S. Navy's Ohio, Seawolf, and Virginia Submarine Programs
This volume presents an overview of lessons learned from three U.S. Navy submarine programs that could help inform future program managers.
Nov 16, 2011
Report
Learning from Experience: Volume III: Lessons from the United Kingdom's Astute Submarine Program
This volume presents a set of lessons learned from the United Kingdom's Astute submarine program that could help inform future program managers.
Nov 16, 2011
Report
Lessons from the Submarine Programs of the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia
An examination of five submarine programs in the three countries—the UK's Astute program; the U.S. Navy's Ohio, Seawolf, and Virginia programs; and Australia's Collins program—identifies lessons that could help inform future program managers.
Nov 16, 2011

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RAND Topic:
Submarines

Topic Synonyms:
Nuclear Submarines

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